

# Heavy Vehicle Networks and Chip Level Forensics

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Jeremy Daily, Ph.D., P.E.

[Jeremy.Daily@colostate.edu](mailto:Jeremy.Daily@colostate.edu)



SYSTEMS ENGINEERING  
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# Heavy Vehicle Networks

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Understanding SAE J1939 and CAN data



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# Chip Level Forensics

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Extracting and decoding data from memory in electronic control units



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# Scope

- Chip level forensics is the process of extracting and decoding data from memory bearing chips inside electronic control units
- Utilized when network based forensics (i.e. downloads and diagnostics) are not tenable
- Board level and chip level forensics are treated similarly



## Network Level

Data collected using a vehicle network or bench setup

- Cummins PowerSpec
- Bosch CDR Tool

## Board Level

Data collected through internal debug and programming ports

- KTAG
- PE Micro

## Chip Level

Data collected from a chip extracted from the board and read using a chip reader

- Xeltek Super Pro

Hybrid: Chip Transplants



# Problem Statement


- We want to connect to a truck...



## Vehicle Sudden Deceleration Report Record 1

Engine Type	ISX 2013	Ecm Code	EF10067.34
Engine Serial Number	79749226	Software Phase	9.40.0.53
Unit Number	0000000000	Extraction Date	09-18-2017 10:00:16
Sudden Decel Threshold Rate:	7.00 mph	ECM Run time	8120:27:45
Occurrence Date: N/A		ECM Run Time at Occurrence: 7472:53:17	
Air Temperature (°F) at Occurrence: 69		Occurrence Distance (mi): 371978.5	

Vehicle Speed



Engine Speed




...and get data.

Example from  
Cummins PowerSpec

# Engine Control Module Location



# Engine Control Module Location






Sometimes the ECU is  
Broken



## The Recovered Module: No Communications



# DDEC Decoding

## (See SAE 2015-01-1450)

**Extracting Event Data from Memory Chips within a Detroit Diesel DDEC V**

2015-01-1450


Published 04/14/2015

**Jeremy Daily, Andrew Kongs, James Johnson, and Jose Corcega**

University of Tulsa

**CITATION:** Daily, J., Kongs, A., Johnson, J., and Corcega, J., "Extracting Event Data from Memory Chips within a Detroit Diesel DDEC V," SAE Technical Paper 2015-01-1450, 2015, doi:10.4271/2015-01-1450.

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# DDEC Data Decoding Overview

1. Problem definition
2. Figuring out what to look for (Produce Known Data)
3. Locating known data in memory from an exemplar ECM
4. Finding data in the subject ECM (Unknown)
5. Decoding and presenting the data

# Normal: DDEC Reports

## DDEC® Reports - Hard Brake

#1

Print Date: 10/2/2013 2:30 PM  
University of Tulsa

Trip: 09/17/12 12:26:15 To 10/02/13 (CST)  
Vehicle ID: DDEC 6 TIB  
Driver ID:  
Odometer: 619.0 mi  
Engine S/N: 06R1003832

Trip Distance	619.0 mi	Trip Time	0:00:00
Trip Fuel	0.00 gal	Fuel Consumption	0.00 gal/h
Fuel Economy	0.00 mpg	Idle Time	0:00:00
Avg Drive Load	0 %	Idle Percent	0.00 %
Avg Vehicle Speed	0.0 mph	Idle Fuel	0.00 gal
		Parked Regen Time	0:00:00

Incident Time: 10/2/2013 1:07:54 PM (CST) Incident Odometer: 619.0 mi

Time	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Engine Speed (rpm)	Brake	Clutch	Engine Load (%)	Throttle (%)	Cruise	Diag. Code
-0:59	23.5	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:58	22.0	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:57	20.0	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:56	18.0	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:55	16.0	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:54	14.0	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:53	12.0	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:52	10.0	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:51	8.0	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:50	6.5	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:49	4.0	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:48	2.5	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes
-0:47	1.0	0	No	No	0.00	0.00	No	Yes


# A direct approach may be needed

- The electrical system is compromised.



# Bench Top Download (or Image?)

• But this sets new faults.




# Bench Top Download (Fault Free)



# But, sometimes it's not that easy.



The electrical system is compromised.




# Attempted Download

- Able to connect, but throws a J1708 Network Error
- This isn't covered in the manual...
- Let's take a peek inside the module.

# Gaining Chip Access

- Accessing the chips with a vise and brute force...






Gaining Chip Access

with a milling machine...





Hot air rework station to remove the flash memory

Chip Removal






## Crash Induced Access

The enclosure is in pieces




# Chip Identification

- DDEC 5
  - 1. Custom ASIC – similar to later DDEC4
  - 2. Cypress CY62137VLL SRAM
  - 3. AMD AM29BL802CB Flash Storage ICs
  - 4. MPC555LF8MZP40 32-bit CPU
  - 5. Real-time clock IC EM V3020




# Another DDEC V

- Data is stored on flash memory.
- This DDEC5 used an Intel chip.
- Each chip stores 1 megabyte




# DDEC IV Chip Identification

1. MC68332 – 32-bit CPU
2. Real-time Clock controller
3. Presumed Custom ASIC controller
4. CAN Controller
5. Intel Flash Storage IC AB28F400




# CAT ADEM III Chip Identification


1. Toshiba SRAM
2. MC68HC705C9A 8-bit Microcontroller (EEPROM)
3. Intel CAN 2.0 Controller
4. MC68336 32-bit Microprocessor (note: Mask-ROM + SRAM)
5. AMI IC Branded Caterpillar, Presumed ASIC
6. Intel AB28F800 5V Flash Storage



# Reading Memory Chip Contents



# Results in a Hex Editor




# Understanding Hex Data as Powers of 2

Bit position	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	Notes
Exponent	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	1 less than position
2^Exponent	128	64	32	16	8	4	2	1	Value of the bits
Bits	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	Example
Bit values	128	0	0	16	8	4	0	0	156
Nibbles		9				C			Use letters for numbers > 9
Byte (hex)			9C						Concatenate Nibbles
Decimal				156					

- Hex is base 16 condensed representation of binary (base 2)
- Uses 0-9, A-F to get 16 characters
- Each character is a nibble (4-bits), 2 nibbles is a byte (8-bits)
- All data in computers and networks are represented as binary (1 or 0)

# Human Readable Data

Letters and numbers are encoded using ASCII. Look for known ASCII, like VIN and Serial Number.



# Hex Data...



## Hexadecimal Data

B600:	20	50	08	00	00	00	00	00	00
B608:	00	00	00	00	AA	00	00	00	00
B610:	00	00	00	00	AA	45	F9	F9	
B618:	F9	F9	F9	9D	F9	F9	FF	AA	
B620:	AA	AA	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
B628:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
B630:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
B638:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
B640:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
B648:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
B650:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	AA	
B658:	00	25	82	20	50	08	00	00	
B660:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
B668:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
B670:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
B678:	00	00	00	00	00	00	43	69	
B680:	00	00	00	55	AA	AA	AA	AA	
B688:	00	00	00	BE	86	00	01	16	
B690:	87	00	01	6C	88	00	01	7D	

Manufacturers specify what the hex data means

Sometimes, manufacturers use standards for the meaning of data

Reverse engineering processes can help decode non-standardized data

# Meaning Applied to HVEDRs

- Standards Based Meaning
- SAE J1587

## A.84 ROAD SPEED

Indicated vehicle velocity.

Parameter Data Length: 1 Character

Data Type: Unsigned Short Integer

Bit Resolution: 0.805 km/h (0.5 mph)

Maximum Range: 0.0 to 205.2 km/h (0.0 to 127.5 mph)

Transmission Update Period: 0.1 s

Message Priority: 1

Format:

PID	Data
84	a
a—	Road speed

- SAE J1939-71
- SAE J1939-73

<b>SAE International™</b>	<b>SURFACE VEHICLE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE</b>	<b>SAE</b>	<b>J1587 JUL2008</b>
Issued	1988-01	Revised	2008-07
Superseding J1587 FEB2002			

Electronic Data Interchange Between Microcomputer Systems  
in Heavy-Duty Vehicle Applications

<b>SAE International™</b>	<b>SURFACE VEHICLE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE</b>	<b>SAE</b>	<b>J1939-71 FEB2010</b>
Issued	1994-08	Revised	2010-02
Superseding J1939-71 JAN2009			


Vehicle Application Layer (Through February 2009)

# Human Readable Hex

Letters and numbers are encoded using ASCII.

Letters and numbers are encoded using ASCII.

Strategy: Look for known ASCII like VIN and Serial Number



# 2 Byte Reversals


- The flash memory is used such that the bytes are stored with bytes that are reversed.
  - The VIN from the raw memory says:
  - F1 JU 6A KC 63 WL 23 93 ◊4
- After swapping every 2 bytes, it becomes:

1FUJA6CK36LW32394

- This is 18 bytes, but VINs are 17 characters
- We can also find serial numbers (search for “R6”)

# Simulated Data

- Issue: Still need to decode the data...
- Strategy: Get an exemplar ECM and put a known speed record on it to find the Hard Brake and Last Stop Events.





# Get help from the network logs

- DDEC Reports downloads data in 9 groups called data pages.
- Use J1587 Transport layer to reconstruct the network traffic.
- \*.XTR file is close to a network log.
- We can map the XTR file contents to DDEC Reports elements (See SAE 2014-01-0495)
- Enables pattern matching for data elements like Mileage and Times.



# Find the patterns (Hard Brake)

# Last Stop Data


# Hard Brake 1 Comparison



# Hard Brake #2 Comparison



# Last Stop Comparison



# Daily Engine Usage

## DDEC® Reports - Daily Engine Usage

Print Date: 8/21/2013 11:08 AM

Date Range: 01/18/07 To 01/07/00 (EST)


University of Tulsa  
800 S. Tucker Dr  
Tulsa, OK 74104  
(918) 631-3056

Vehicle ID: TIB DDEC4  
Driver ID:  
Engine S/N: 06R0499534

Date:	1/18/2007
Start Time:	00:00:00 EST
Odometer:	1006109.00 mi
Distance:	548.80 mi
Fuel:	95.25 gal
Fuel Economy:	5.76 mpg
Average Speed:	59.54 mph

Total (hh:mm)	09:13	06:00	08:47
Hour (EST)	Drive (min)	Idle (min)	Off (min)
00:00-02:00	0	120	0
02:00-04:00	0	120	0
04:00-06:00	96	24	0
06:00-08:00	104	16	0
08:00-10:00	110	10	0
10:00-12:00	54	66	0
12:00-14:00	120	0	0
14:00-16:00	69	4	47
16:00-18:00	0	0	120
18:00-20:00	0	0	120
20:00-22:00	0	0	120
22:00-24:00	0	0	120

# Daily Engine Usage Log Data - .XTR file



The screenshot shows the HxD Hex Editor interface with the following details:

- File Path:** C:\Users\jeremy-daily\Documents\Dropbox\SAE Paper on Digital Forensics\BaselineDDEC4.XTR
- Menu Bar:** File, Edit, Search, View, Analysis, Extras, Window, ?
- Toolbar:** Includes icons for Open, Save, Find, Copy, Paste, and various analysis tools. The current display mode is set to **16** (hex), **ANSI**, and **dec**.
- Table:** A data table showing memory dump content. The columns are labeled **Offset (d)** and address values from **00001760** to **00002112**. The data is displayed in three columns: hex, ASCII, and raw binary.
- Annotations:** The cell at **Offset 1956** (row 1956) is highlighted with a blue box, showing the value **78 78 18 10 0A 42 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 68**. To the right of this cell, the ASCII representation **xx...B.....h** is shown, with a tooltip indicating **n6xE...ú.b.Đbv)**.
- Bottom Status Bar:** Shows **Offset: 1956**, **Block: 1956-1991**, **Length: 36**, and **Overwrite**.

# Determining Data Meaning in the Daily Engine Usage Log

## Interpreted Data

Bytes Sequence	Hex Value (s)	Decimal	LSB Value	Meaning	Value
0-1	70 15	5488	0.1 mile	Distance	548.8 miles
2-3	7D 01	381	0.25 gal	Fuel	95.25 gallons
4-7	50 B4 77 29	695710800	1 sec from epoch	Start Time	17 Jan 2007 at 23:00:00 CST
8-11	25 85 99 00	10061093	0.1 mile	Odometer	1006109.3 miles
12-23	78 78 18 10 0A 42 00 04 00 00 00 00	120 120 24 16 10 66 0 4 0 0 0 0	1 Minute	Idle Time	Same as Decimal
24-35	00 00 60 68 6E 36 78 45 00 00 00 00	0 0 96 104 54 120 69 0 0 0 0	1 Minute	Drive Time	Same as Decimal

All other data are calculated

Interestingly, the .XTR file contains minutes, but the chip memory contains seconds.

# Chip Memory Contents

XTR file has 36 Bytes for 1 day in the Daily Engine Usage Log.

However... The memory record containing the Daily Engine Usage data is contained in a circular 30-day buffer with each day holding 66 bytes.

This was determined by locating the odometer readings since the MSB's were the same. There were 66 bytes from one 4-byte odometer reading to another.

Data Description	Unit	Location and sequence	Word Size (LSB last)	LSB Value	Example
Start Time Stamp	Seconds	1, 0, 3, 2	U32	1	Figure 16
Odometer	Miles	5, 4, 7, 6	U32	1/640	Figure 17
Distance Traveled	Miles	9, 8, 11, 10	U32	1/640	Figure 18
Fuel Used	Gallons	12, 13	U16	0.125	Figure 19

# Daily Engine Usage Time


- XTR file = 24 bytes
- Memory Chips = 48 bytes, so there twice the bytes that are in memory but not transmitted on the network.
- XTR file has minutes coded as single bytes (0-255)
- Memory stores times in seconds as 2 bytes (16 bit) (0-65536)
- Only Drive time and Idle time in each 2-hour block are recorded in memory.
- Drive + Idle seconds in memory contents did not always sum to 7200 seconds ( 2 hours)

# Decoded Daily Engine Usage Log

Start Date	Start Time	Odometer	Distance	Fuel	Total Daily Time		00:00-02:00		02:00-04:00		04:00-06:00		06:00-08:00		...
Central Standard Time		Miles	Miles	Gallons	Idle	Drive	Idle	Drive	Idle	Drive	Idle	Drive	Idle	Drive	
Thu, 07 Jan 2010	02:00:00AM	530196.8	346.5	76.750	15:23	08:04	82:33	26:49	65:43	54:17	20:38	99:22	55:49	41:00	
Fri, 08 Jan 2010	02:00:00AM	530543.3	470.0	111.625	13:60	09:58	120:00	00:00	108:47	11:12	00:00	120:00	05:12	114:48	
Sat, 09 Jan 2010	02:00:00AM	531013.3	506.1	111.750	13:57	09:43	120:00	00:00	120:00	00:00	49:13	49:57	03:28	116:33	

# Issues

- Broken ECUs usually lose power before the events have a chance to write.
- Hard Brake and Last Stop data are from the previous events (i.e. not interesting).
- The process of removing the chip is destructive.
- Reinstalling the chip requires special equipment (and patience)
- Ball Grid Array (BGA) chips are particularly challenging.



<https://www.forentec.ch/weitere-services/mobile-forensics-training/teeltech-bga-chip-off-forensic/>

# Sometimes there are serious issues...



# Missing Data??



Can we read memory in place?

The chip removal method is challenging.

# Case Study: Cummins

Cummins CM870  
(MPC5xx)




Cummins CM2350  
(MPC55xx-57xx)



# Case Study: Cummins

Cummins CM870  
(MPC5xx)




Cummins CM2350  
(MPC5674F)



# Goals and Objectives

- Safely extract binary data from the broken ECU
- Decode the extracted data to recover
  - Sudden Deceleration Records
  - Data Plate Information
  - Fault Codes
  - Parameters and Settings
- Write the extracted binary to a working ECU
- Download the data using diagnostic or forensic computer programs



# Data Extraction via the JTAG Port

- Use the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) specified programming port for the microprocessor on the ECUs printed circuit board.
- Case study used the following tools:

AlienTech K-TAG Master kit



PEmicro CYCLONE FX Programmer

# Using the K-TAG Tool


# Example for the CM870



# K-TAG Software Startup



# Search for ECM



# Locate the JTAG Port


- After choosing the correct ECU, click on the bookmark icon for wiring instruction



**Instructions**

1. Remove the ECU from the vehicle;
2. Open the ECU, being careful not to damage the parts inside;
3. **Reconnect the ECU to the vehicle and start the engine, in order to make sure the ECU is still in working order and has not been damaged in the process.**
4. Remove again the ECU from the vehicle;
5. **Connect to the ECU:**


The programming pads are shown in red in the picture.  
**Note:** Open the ECU cover on the side without connector.



6. **Always** make a full backup of the ECU;
7. Proceed with **reading/writing**.

# JTAG Port Connection

- Follow the instruction on the software, solder the port and attach the ribbon.




# Connect Power

- Attach the D-sub cable to the ECU connector
- Power
- Ignition




# PC Connection Setup


- Connect the KTAG to the ECU and the computer




# Retrieving Data




# Retrieving Data



# Save the Binary Data



# Binary Result in Hex Editor




File Edit View Grammar Script Window Help

ISO\_8859-1:1987 <none> <none> Go To Position Encoding Grammar Parse Results Script Process Results

Start	End	Length	Content
0x574	0x574	1	7C


# Chip Level Access for Flash

- Flash chip, can be retrieved using individual chip reader



# Chip Level Access: EEPROM

- For CM870, EEPROM carries dataplate information via ASCII



# Dataplate Attribution Data

- Closer look at PowerSpec and EEPROM (for CM870)

## Engine Dataplate Report

Engine Type	ISX 02	Ecm Code	AB10402.22
Engine Serial Number	79076145	Software Phase	6.5.4.2
Unit Number	25175	Extraction Date	04-02-2018 05:48:00

## ECM Information

Module Name	CM870
Ecm Code	AB10402.2
Software Phase	6.5.4.2
ECM Serial Number	23052876
ECM Part Number	3683289

## Engine Information


Engine Model	ISX 02
Engine Build Date	N/A
Engine Serial Number	7907614
Do Option	1325
SC Option	11145

## Vehicle Information

Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)	4V4NC9TG25N391063
Vehicle or Equipment Year	
OEM Vehicle Equipment Model	STA15
Customer Name	central
Customer Location	utah
Vehicle Unit Number	25175


## Part of the Hex editor Window

# Example for the Cummins CM2350




# CM2350 Component Identification

Open the ECM to identify JTAG port




Where is the  
JTAG port?

# CM2350 Connections from KTAG Software




Power, ignition and ground

Ribbon Cable





Test Pad Connections

# JTAG is built into a Nexus debug port



# KTAG Wiring Connections



# Summary of Binary Data Collection

## CM870


- Three chips
  - Microprocessor
  - External Flash
  - EEPROM (16 kilobytes)
- 1 MB Flash (Intel)
- Flash can be separately extracted with the Xeltek chip reader
- Flex PCB Assembly
- EEPROM contains Data Plate

## CM2350

- Single Chip
  - Microprocessor contains flash memory
- 3 MB Flash
- Ball Grid Array
- Non-Standard JTAG Pinout
- Traditional FR4 Printed Circuit Board

# Chip Swap

Removing a Chip by Carson Green:  
[https://youtu.be/q\\_pJ8OYdXkQ](https://youtu.be/q_pJ8OYdXkQ)



<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWaZ7puxlmvRRNtnOxc4bAA>

# Introducing the Virtual Chip Swap

**We can extract data from an ECU, but can we write data back to it?**

# Cloning an ECU

Damaged ECU




Broken  
Connector



Broken  
Connector  
Backside

Binary File



4-24-19 CM2350 Forensics Case.MPC


Offset(h)	Decoded text
002FFB00	*.æ.plà..c.ZpGà.
002FFB10	„.HyÝfÝpià.\g.\
002FFB20	Å... ñ..ÿÿÿÿÿÿ
002FFB30	!.Ð... H..f".. à.I.H.OÑ€**.á..±
002FFB40	€ .ä ..ß(n.íà.Àß .få..=å..>å.À. .
002FFB50	Ä.däitå?.... .!
002FFB60	€0..yyyy.zÿy..h°
002FFB70	00 34 30 38 31 36 FF F0 02 03 01 08 00 00 00 00 040816ÿ.....
002FFB80	Copyright (c) 20
002FFB90	09-2016 Cummins
002FFBA0	Inc. All rights
002FFBB0	reserved.....
002FFBC0	.ÿ.....ÿ.....
002FFBD0	.....@.@.....
002FFBE0	.....@.@.....
002FFBF0	.....@.@.....
002FFC00	.....@.@.....
002FFC10	.....@.@.....
002FFC20	.....@.@.....
002FFC30	.....@.@.....
002FFC40	.....@.@.....
002FFC50	.....ÿ..E..
002FFC60	.....H..ÿ..M..
002FFC70	.....@.N..@.en.O..
002FFC80	.....ÿ..@..C..
002FFC90	.....ÿ..v..@....~..
002FFCA0	.....@.P..@..j..«..
002FFCB0	.....@.P..@..N..Ü..
002FFCC0	.....@.d°..ÿ..-..
002FFCD0	.....@..@..?0..»..
002FFCE0	.....@..@..?i..@....`..
002FFCF0	.....ÿ..£.....
002FFD00	.....@..@..@..@..@..

# Cloning Process

# Binary File

4-24-19 CM2350 Forensics Case.MPC																	
Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	Decoded text
002FFB00	2A	07	E6	0F	70	6C	E0	08	1C	63	0A	5A	70	8C	E0	08	*.æ.plå..c.ZpGå.
002FFB10	1C	84	09	48	79	DD	83	DD	70	EC	E0	08	5C	67	0A	5C	„.HyfYpiå.\g.\
002FFB20	C5	01	00	90	20	F1	00	04	FF	Å...ñ..ÿÿÿÿÿÿ							
002FFB30	18	21	06	D0	1B	81	09	20	48	07	7F	83	22	14	0D	3C	!.D...H.f"..<
002FFB40	E0	02	49	07	48	04	30	D1	80	2A	2A	06	E1	15	1C	B1	à.I.H.ÖN€**,.±
002FFB50	80	A0	1B	E4	A0	0C	7F	DF	28	6E	0D	CE	E0	09	C1	DF	€.ä..ß(n.íå.Áß
002FFB60	0D	CD	E4	06	0D	3D	E1	04	0D	3E	E5	02	C2	7F	20	04	íå..=å..>å..
002FFB70	00	C4	0C	64	E4	EF	74	E3	04	3F	1B	81	08	20	18	21	Å.däitä?....!
002FFB80	80	30	00	04	FF	FF	FF	FF	00	5A	FF	FF	00	02	68	B0	€0..ÿÿÿ.Zÿÿ..h°
002FFB90	30	34	30	38	31	36	FF	FF	02	03	01	08	00	00	00	00	040816ÿÿ.....
002FFBA0	43	6F	70	79	72	69	67	68	74	20	28	63	29	20	32	30	Copyright (c) 20
002FFBB0	30	39	2D	32	30	31	36	20	43	75	6D	6D	69	6E	73	20	09-2016 Cummins
002FFBC0	49	6E	63	2E	20	41	6C	6C	20	72	69	67	68	74	73	20	Inc. All rights
002FFBD0	72	65	73	65	72	76	65	64	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	reserved.....
002FFBE0	00	FF	FD	06	00	01	00	00	00	FF	FC	00	00	02	00	00	.ÿý.....ÿü.....
002FFBF0	00	02	00	08	00	04	00	00	40	00	40	20	00	05	00	00	.....@.@.....
002FFC00	40	00	00	50	00	0B	00	00	40	00	00	10	00	0C	00	00	€..P.....€.....
002FFC10	40	01	00	04	00	0D	00	00	40	01	00	10	00	0E	00	00	€.....€.....
002FFC20	40	01	00	06	00	10	00	00	40	01	00	08	00	11	00	00	€.....€.....
002FFC30	00	FF	FD	08	00	13	00	00	40	01	00	0C	00	15	00	00	.ÿý.....€.....
002FFC40	40	01	00	0A	00	18	00	00	40	01	00	00	00	19	00	00	€.....€.....
002FFC50	00	02	00	10	00	2E	00	00	FF	FC	08	00	45	00	00	.....ÿ..E..	
002FFC60	00	02	00	10	00	48	00	00	00	FF	FC	08	00	4D	00	00	....H..ÿü..M..
002FFC70	40	00	00	30	00	4E	00	00	40	02	65	6E	00	4F	00	00	@..0.N..@.en.O..
002FFC80	00	FF	FC	20	01	13	00	00	40	00	00	43	01	15	00	00	.ÿü.....@.C.....
002FFC90	00	FF	FD	09	02	76	00	00	40	00	0E	2E	06	98	00	00	.ÿý..v..@..~..
002FFCA0	40	00	3F	D4	06	A7	00	00	40	00	0E	6A	06	AB	00	00	@.žô.S..@..j..»..
002FFCB0	40	00	40	50	06	DA	00	00	40	00	40	4E	06	DB	00	00	@..P.Ú..@..@.N.Û..
002FFCC0	40	02	64	B0	07	94	00	00	00	FF	FC	0C	07	96	00	00	@..@..”..ÿü..-..
002FFCD0	40	00	0E	00	07	C4	00	00	40	00	3F	D8	08	BB	00	00	@...Ä..@..?@..»..
002FFCE0	40	00	3F	EC	10	00	00	00	40	00	00	1A	12	91	00	00	@..?i..@..@..`..`..
002FFCF0	00	FF	FD	00	12	A3	00	00	00	02	00	14	14	05	00	00	.ÿý..£..@..@..`..
002FFDD0	40	00	40	28	19	14	00	00	00	FF	FC	04	1A	36	00	00	@..@..@..@..@..

Load Binary onto working ECU;  
Perform a bench download



# Interpret Data from ECU after Cloning

- After cloning the ECU, download with traditional benchtop methods
- Example: Cummins PowerSpec with a DPA5 connected to a Smart Sensor Simulator 2


Record 1

Time (Seconds)	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Engine Speed (rpm)	Engine Load (%)	Throttle (%)	Brake Status	Clutch Status	Cruise Status	Lamp Status
-59	6	683	34.8	30.1	-	-	-	-
-58	7	788	33.6	32.2	-	-	-	-
-57	7	813	21.9	27.5	-	-	-	-

## Sudden Vehicle Speed Deceleration Report Record 1


Engine Type	ISX 2010	Ecm Code	CL10132.39
Engine Serial Number	60811136	Software Phase	7.70.0.71
Unit Number	0000000000	Extraction Date	04-03-2019 04:37:51
Sudden Decel Threshold Rate:	N/A	ECM Run time	8227:56:32
Occurrence Date: N/A		ECM Run Time at Occurrence: 2899:18:36	
Air Temperature (°F) at Occurrence: 72		Occurrence Distance (mi): 109323.4	

Vehicle Speed



# Cloning Process with the K-TAG

Select Clone ECU function and follow instructions



# Cloning Example: Two Different ECUs

Engine Dataplate Report			
Engine Type	ISX 2013	Ecm Code	EF10067.36
Engine Serial Number	0	Software Phase	9.40.13.61
Unit Number	0000000000	Extraction Date	07-03-2018 12:37:22
ECM Information			
Module Name	CM2350	Module Name	CM2350
Ecm Code	EF10067.36	Ecm Code	DT90216.08
Software Phase	9.40.13.61	Software Phase	21.60.71.2
ECM Serial Number	3032682	ECM Serial Number	6069868
ECM Part Number	5290170	ECM Part Number	4358814
Engine Information			
Engine Model	ISX 2013	Engine Model	ISB 2013
Engine Build Date	010185	Engine Build Date	110516
Engine Serial Number	0	Engine Serial Number	73993334
Do Option	1874	Do Option	94370
SC Option	12186	SC Option	92050
Vehicle Information			
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)	1HSDJAPR7EH784086	Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)	2NKHHM7X3HM156651
Vehicle or Equipment Year	2014	Vehicle or Equipment Year	*****
OEM Vehicle Equipment Model	*****	OEM Vehicle Equipment Model	T300
Customer Name	CustomerName**	Customer Name	CustomerName**
Customer Location	*****	Customer Location	*****
Vehicle Unit Number	0000000000	Vehicle Unit Number	*****

ECM dataplate of the two ECUs **before** cloning

# Cloning Results: A is now B

Engine Dataplate Report			
Engine Type	ISB 2013	Ecm Code	DT90216.08
Engine Serial Number		Software Phase	21.60.71.2
Unit Number		Extraction Date	07-03-2018 03:51:29
<b>ECM Information</b>			
Module Name	CM2350	Module Name	CM2350
Ecm Code	DT90216.08	Ecm Code	DT90216.08
Software Phase	21.60.71.2	Software Phase	21.60.71.2
ECM Serial Number	3032682	ECM Serial Number	6069868
ECM Part Number	5290170	ECM Part Number	4358814
<b>Engine Information</b>			
Engine Model	A	ISB 2013	ISB 2013
Engine Build Date		110516	110516
Engine Serial Number		73993334	73993334
Do Option		94370	94370
SC Option		92050	92050
<b>Vehicle Information</b>			
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)	2NKHHM7X3HM156651	Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)	2NKHHM7X3HM156651
Vehicle or Equipment Year	*****	Vehicle or Equipment Year	*****
OEM Vehicle Equipment Model	T300	OEM Vehicle Equipment Model	T300
Customer Name	CustomerName**	Customer Name	CustomerName**
Customer Location	*****	Customer Location	*****
Vehicle Unit Number	*****	Vehicle Unit Number	*****

ECM dataplate of the two ECMS **after cloning**

# Data Analysis

**What if cloning doesn't work (or you don't want to spend the money on another ECU)?**

# Data Analysis: Human Readable Text

Some meaningful strings are present indicating that the data is not encrypted

# Data Analysis: Binary File

- Flash chip data should carry Sudden Deceleration information (vehicle speed, engine RPM, etc.)
- The file is 3 MB so how can we locate the Sudden Decel?

000001FF70 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF-FF FF  
.....  
000001FF80 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF-FF FF  
.....  
000001FF90 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF-FF FF  
.....  
000001FFA0 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF-FF FF  
.....  
000001FFB0 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF-FF FF  
.....  
000001FFC0 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF-FF FF  
.....  
000001FFD0 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF-FF FF  
.....  
000001FFE0 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF-FF FF  
.....  
000001FFF0 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF-FF FF  
.....  
0000020000 94 21 FF F0 7C 08 02 A6-93 E1 00 0C 90 01 00 14 .!..  
|@. ....  
..@  
0000020010 3F E0 00 B2 A3 FF 5B 96-3C E0 00 B2 38 E7 30 BA  
?....[.<...8.0.  
0000020020 7C E6 3B 78 3D 00 00 B2-39 08 30 B8 7D 05 43 78  
|.;x=...9@0.}|Cx  
0000020030 3D 20 00 B1 A1 29 E3 74-7C 09 F8 00 41 81 00 1C =  
...).t| ..A..  
0000020040 39 80 20 00 B1 88 00 00-3C 80 00 B1 A0 84 E3 76 9.  
....<.....v  
0000020050 B0 87 00 00 48 00 00 24-3C 80 00 B1 A0 84 E3 70  
....H..\$<.....p  
0000020060 B0 88 00 00 3D 00 00 B1-A1 08 E3 72 B1 07 00 00 ....  
=....@.r. ....  
0000020070 7D 44 40 50 38 8A 20 00-3D 80 00 B2 B0 8C 30 BC }  
D@P8. .=....0.  
0000020080 3C E0 00 B2 A0 E7 62 68-A1 45 00 00 7D 07 51 D6  
<.....bh.E..} Q.  
0000020090 3C A0 00 B0 38 A5 5A 58-A1 65 00 00 A1 26 00 00  
<...8.ZX.e....&..  
00000200A0 7C 6B 49 D6 3C C0 00 B0-38 C6 5A 5A A1 46 00 00 |kr.  
<...8.ZZ.F..  
00000200B0 54 89 04 3E 7C 8A 49 D6-7D 83 40 50 7D 04 62 14 T.} >  
|.I.}@P}^b||  
00000200C0 2C 08 00 00 40 81 00 2C-7D 08 6E 70 3D 60 00 00 ,@...  
@.,}@np='..  
00000200D0 61 6B 8C A0 7C 08 58 00-40 80 00 0C 7D 04 43 78 ak..  
|@x.@..

# Data Analysis

One approach:

- Observe that vehicle speed for Record 1 in this ECM has 150 mph for the first 60s.
- There should be repeated data in the binary.

Record 1

Time (Seconds )	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Engine Speed (rpm)	Engine Load (%)	Throttle (%)	Brake Status	Clutch Status	Cruise Status	Lamp Status
-59	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-58	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-57	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-56	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-55	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-54	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-53	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-52	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-51	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-50	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-49	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-48	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-47	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-46	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-45	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-44	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-43	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-42	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-41	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-40	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-39	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-38	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-37	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On

# Data Analysis

Converting the actual vehicle speed from the report to raw data format using SAE J1939-71

## **SPN 84**

### ***Wheel-Based Vehicle Speed***

Speed of the vehicle as calculated from wheel or tailshaft speed.

Data Length: 2 bytes

Resolution: 1/256 km/h per bit, 0 offset

Data Range: 0 to 250.996 km/h

Operational Range: same as data range


Type: Measured

Supporting Information:

PGN reference: 65265

# Data Analysis Approach

- Convert 150 mph to km/h: 241.4 km/h
- Convert 241.4 km/h to bit:  
$$241.4 \text{ km/h} \times 256 \text{ bit/km/h} = 64798$$
- Convert 64798 to Hex: F1 66
- Look for repeating F1 66 pattern in the report



**NO PATTERN! WHAT NOW?!**

# Data Analysis

- Convert 150 mph to data format without converting to km/h
- Convert 150.000 to hex:  
 $150 * 256 = 38,400$
- Convert 38,400 to Hex: 96 00

# Data Analysis


We got something!

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F
0x0FB1D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0C	31	00	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB1E0	00	00	00	73	00	02	1E	FA	15	9B	85	8A	12	F6	01	D2
0x0FB1F0	79	DC	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
0x0FB200	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00
0x0FB210	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00
0x0FB220	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00
0x0FB230	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB240	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB250	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB260	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
0x0FB270	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00
0x0FB280	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00
0x0FB290	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00
0x0FB2A0	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB2B0	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB2C0	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB2D0	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
0x0FB2E0	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00
0x0FB2F0	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00
0x0FB300	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB310	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00

# Data Analysis

- But is it the vehicle speed log?
- Tracing the speed along to compare with the report. The 2-byte is 12 bytes apart. Find the first change in the speed, 58 8A

0x0FB4C0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00
0x0FB4D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00
0x0FB4E0	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB4F0	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB500	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
0x0FB510	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00
0x0FB520	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00
0x0FB530	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	58	8A	00	00
0x0FB540	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	06	58	00	00	00
0x0FB550	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	74	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB560	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	08	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0x0FB570	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01



# Data Analysis: Confirmation

- Convert 58 8A to actual vehicle speed number:
- 58 8A to Decimal: 22,666
- Convert 22,666 to actual number:

$$22,666 / 256 = 88.54 \text{ mph} \sim 89 \text{ mph}$$

## Record 1

Time (Seconds)	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Engine Speed (rpm)	Engine Load (%)	Throttle (%)	Brake Status	Clutch Status	Cruise Status	Lamp Status
-16	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-15	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-14	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-13	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-12	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-11	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-10	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-9	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-8	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-7	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-6	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-5	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-4	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-3	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-2	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
-1	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
0	150	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
1	89	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On
2	6	0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	On

# Data Analysis

- What about engine RPM, load, throttle, etc.?
- The 14-byte block in Record 2 data, this has more than just 150 mph

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	
0x0FB950	00	00	00	02	14	F8	12	BD	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....ø.½.....
0x0FB960	00	03	01	81	12	7C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	..... .....
0x0FB970	00	1B	12	BF	00	09	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	02	....¿.....
0x0FB980	11	3E	00	21	08	C4	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	11	42
0x0FB990	00	2C	29	03	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	5C	11	E7	00	3E	,,).....\ç.>
0x0FB9A0	42	8E	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	02	7D	19	38	00	76	10	8F
0x0FB9B0	00	00	00	00	00	00	03	AB	15	37	00	3E	00	00	00	00	.....«.7.>....
0x0FB9C0	00	00	00	00	04	0A	17	82	00	94	20	B5	00	00	00	00	.....µ....
0x0FB9D0	00	00	04	C1	21	E3	00	A4	1F	7B	00	00	00	00	00	02	...Á!ã.¤ {.....
0x0FB9E0	05	96	1A	5C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	05	E8	...\......è
0x0FB9F0	1A	40	00	81	0E	9D	00	00	00	00	00	00	06	72	21	77	.@.....r!w
0x0FBA00	00	B6	26	8D	00	00	00	00	00	00	07	BE	26	98	00	99	.¶.....¾&...
0x0FBA10	17	84	00	00	00	00	00	00	08	75	28	36	00	20	00	00	.....u(6. ...
0x0FBA20	00	00	00	00	00	02	08	6F	1D	BF	00	5B	00	00	00	00	.....o¿. [....
0x0FBA30	00	00	1E	FA	15	9B	78	6F	12	F7	01	D2	79	DC	00	00	.. ú..xo.÷.ØyÜ..
0x0FBA40	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	.....
0x0FBA50	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	.....

# Data Analysis: Result

Byte	3 & 4	5 & 6	7 & 8	9 & 10
Hex	07 BE	26 98	00 99	17 84
Convert to Decimal	1,982	9,880	153	6020
Resolution	1/256 mph/bit	1/8 RPM/bit	1/4 %/bit	1/256 %/bit
Actual Number	7.74 mph	1,235 RPM	38.25%	23.52%
	Vehicle Speed	Engine Speed	Throttle	Engine Load

## Record 2

Time (Seconds)	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Engine Speed (rpm)	Engine Load (%)	Throttle (%)	Brake Status	Clutch Status	Cruise Status	Lamp Status
11	6	840	14.6	32.3	-	On	-	-
12	6	1071	38.6	45.5	-	-	-	-
13	8	1235	23.5	38.3	-	-	-	-
14	8	1287	0.0	8.0	-	-	-	-
15	8	952	0.0	22.8	-	On	-	-

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# Data Analysis: Alternative Approach

Another approach to locate sudden deceleration data in binary file:

- Log CAN traffic when downloading sudden deceleration report with Cummins PowerSpec
- Compare the log file with binary to find the pattern.

# Tools




Photo from  
<https://www.diesellaptops.com/collections/cummins/products/cummins-inline-7-data-link-adapter>



Connecting Harness

# Setup



# NMFTA CAN Logger

National Motor Freight Traffic Association and National Science Foundation CAN Data Collection Project



Open Source at:

<https://www.github.com/SystemsCyber/CAN-Logger-3/>

# Downloading Data

CAN traffic was also logged while downloading

Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	Decoded text
00000000	15	00	00	00	E0	86	28	58	38	6D	55	00	02	00	00	08	...àt(X8mU.....
00000010	00	F0	FE	18	FF	FF	FF	00	00	F3	FF	FF	E0	86	28	58	.öp.ÿÿ..öÿÿàt(X
00000020	43	6D	55	00	0D	00	00	08	0F	00	F0	18	C0	7D	7D	FF	CmU.....ö.À}.)ÿ
00000030	0F	FF	FF	FF	E0	86	28	58	4B	6D	55	00	15	00	00	08	.ÿÿÿàt(XKmU.....
00000040	00	FF	EB	18	01	14	FF	73	02	02	02	1B	E0	86	28	58	.ÿë...ÿs....àt(X
00000050	53	6D	55	00	1D	00	00	08	00	04	F0	0C	FE	7D	7D	00	SmU.....ö.p}).
00000060	00	00	FF	7D	E0	86	28	58	5B	6D	55	00	25	00	00	08	..ÿ)àt(X[mU.%...
00000070	00	03	F0	0C	D3	FF	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	E0	86	28	58	..ö.Öÿ.ÿÿÿÿàt(X	
00000080	62	6D	55	00	2D	00	00	08	00	F0	FE	18	FF	FF	FF	00	bmU.-....öp.ÿÿ.
00000090	00	F3	FF	FF	E0	86	28	58	24	7B	55	00	EE	0D	00	08	.öÿÿàt(X\$U.i...
000000A0	00	04	F0	0C	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	E0	86	28	58	..ö.p})...ÿ)àt(X
000000B0	69	7D	55	00	33	10	00	08	00	03	F0	0C	D3	FF	00	FF	i)U.3.....ö.Öy
000000C0	FF	FF	FF	FF	E0	86	28	58	C4	A1	55	00	8E	34	00	08	ÿÿÿÿàt(XÄ;U.Ž4..
000000D0	00	F1	FE	18	FF	00	00	FC	FF	6F	00	CF	E0	86	28	58	.öp.ÿ..üö.äàt(X
000000E0	67	C9	55	00	32	5C	00	08	00	04	F0	0C	FE	7D	7D	00	gÉU.2\....ö.p}).
000000F0	00	00	FF	7D	E0	86	28	58	AC	CB	55	00	77	5E	00	08	..ÿ)àt(X-ÉU.w^..
00000100	00	DF	FE	18	83	E0	2E	7D	FB	FF	FF	FF	E0	86	28	58	.öp.fä.)üÿÿÿàt(X
00000110	CA	EF	55	00	94	82	00	08	00	F2	FE	18	00	00	00	00	ÉiU.",...öp.....
00000120	B2	05	FF	FF	E0	86	28	58	65	17	56	00	2F	AA	00	08	..ÿ)àt(Xe.V./^..
00000130	00	04	F0	0C	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	E0	86	28	58	..ö.p})...ÿ)àt(X
00000140	97	19	56	00	62	AC	00	08	0F	FF	EC	18	20	13	00	03	-.V.b-...ÿi..
00000150	FF	E1	FE	00	E0	86	28	58	F5	3D	56	00	BF	D0	00	08	ÿáp.àt(Xö=V.¿Đ..
00000160	00	03	F0	0C	D3	FF	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	E0	86	28	58	..ö.Öÿ.ÿÿÿÿàt(X	
00000170	98	65	56	00	63	F8	00	08	00	04	F0	0C	FE	7D	7D	00	~e.V.cö....ö.p}).
00000180	00	FF	7D	E0	86	28	58	F5	37	56	00	BF	E1	00	00	08	..ü.ä+.(Xö=V.¿ö..

## CAN traffic logged in raw format

Format convert													
NMFTA Logger 1 CAN_Logger_2 Vehicle Spy													
	Abs.	Time	Channel	ID	B0	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	B7	
1	1479050976.000002		can0	18FEF000	FF	FF	FF	00	00	F3	FF	FF	
2	1479050976.000013		can0	18F0000F	C0	7D	7D	FF	0F	FF	FF	FF	
3	1479050976.000021		can0	18EBFF00	01	14	FF	73	02	02	02	1B	
4	1479050976.000029		can0	0CF00400	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	
5	1479050976.000037		can0	0CF00300	D3	FF	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	
6	1479050976.000045		can0	18FEF000	FF	FF	FF	00	00	F3	FF	FF	
7	1479050976.003566		can0	0CF00400	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	
8	1479050976.004147		can0	0CF00300	D3	FF	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	
9	1479050976.013454		can0	18FEF100	FF	00	00	FC	FF	6F	00	CF	
10	1479050976.023602		can0	0CF00400	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	
11	1479050976.024183		can0	18FEDF00	83	E0	2E	7D	FB	FF	FF	FF	
12	1479050976.033428		can0	18FEF200	00	00	00	00	B2	05	FF	FF	
13	1479050976.043567		can0	0CF00400	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	
14	1479050976.044130		can0	18ECCFF0F	20	13	00	03	FF	E1	FE	00	
15	1479050976.053439		can0	0CF00300	D3	FF	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	
16	1479050976.063587		can0	0CF00400	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	
17	1479050976.064176		can0	18F00100	FF	FF	FF	CF	FF	FF	FF	FF	
18	1479050976.083569		can0	0CF00400	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	
19	1479050976.093435		can0	18FEF000	FF	FF	FF	00	00	F3	FF	FF	
20	1479050976.094004		can0	18F0000F	C0	7D	7D	FF	0F	FF	FF	FF	
21	1479050976.099584		can0	18EBFF0F	01	03	01	60	22	50	A0	41	
22	1479050976.103564		can0	0CF00400	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	
23	1479050976.104145		can0	0CF00300	D3	FF	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	
24	1479050976.113452		can0	18FEF100	FF	00	00	FC	FF	6F	00	CF	
25	1479050976.123565		can0	0CF00400	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	
26	1479050976.133426		can0	18FEF200	00	00	00	00	B2	05	FF	FF	
27	1479050976.143565		can0	0CF00400	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	
28	1479050976.153437		can0	0CF00300	D3	FF	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	
29	1479050976.159573		can0	18EBFF0F	02	20	E0	2E	20	20	35	20	
30	1479050976.163585		can0	0CF00400	FE	7D	7D	00	00	00	FF	7D	

## CAN traffic logged in readable format

# CAN Data Logging Results

There is pattern for the Sudden Deceleration records

Offset (h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B
000F31BC	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
000F31C8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
000F31D4	00	00	00	00	0C	31	00	00	00	00	00	00
000F31E0	00	00	00	73	00	02	1E	FA	15	9B	85	8A
000F31EC	12	F6	01	D2	79	DC	00	00	96	00	00	00
000F31F8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00
000F3204	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00
000F3210	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
000F321C	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
000F3228	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
000F3234	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00	00	00
000F3240	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00	00
000F324C	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	96	00	00

Raw binary data from KTAG extraction

1479051111.967139	can0	18EBFF00	08	04	AF	00	03	03	6C	00
1479051111.976171	can0	18EBFA00	01	45	1A	A0	00	00	04	26
1479051111.986092	can0	18EBFA00	02	1E	FA	15	9B	85	8A	12
1479051111.996095	can0	18EBFA00	03	F6	01	D2	79	DC	00	00
1479051112.006143	can0	18EBFA00	04	96	00	00	00	00	00	00
1479051112.016150	can0	18EBFA00	05	00	00	00	00	01	00	00
1479051112.026145	can0	18EBFA00	06	96	00	00	00	00	00	00
1479051112.026713	can0	18EBFF00	09	04	01	66	00	04	01	94
1479051112.036134	can0	18EBFA00	07	00	00	00	00	01	00	00
1479051112.046148	can0	18EBFA00	08	96	00	00	00	00	00	00
1479051112.056151	can0	18EBFA00	09	00	00	00	00	01	00	00
1479051112.066164	can0	18EBFA00	0A	96	00	00	00	00	00	00
1479051112.076132	can0	18EBFA00	0B	00	00	00	00	01	00	00
1479051112.086140	can0	18EBFA00	0C	96	00	00	00	00	00	00
1479051112.086713	can0	18EBFF00	0A	04	03	01	B9	04	04	03
1479051112.096128	can0	18EBFA00	0D	00	00	00	00	01	00	00
1479051112.106137	can0	18EBFA00	0E	96	00	00	00	00	00	00
1479051112.116171	can0	18EBFA00	0F	00	00	00	00	01	00	00

Logged CAN traffic data, filtered for J1939 Transport Protocol messages

# Interpreter Python Source Code Snippet

## Attribution Data

```
with open(filename,'rb') as binfile:  
    raw_data = binfile.read()  
  
#Extract run time, occurrence distance, and temp of 3 records  
ECM_run_time1 = struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record1:record1+4])[0]/4  
Occurrence_distance1 = struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record1+20:record1+24])[0]/205.99605  
Temp1 = (((((struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record1+18:record1+22])[0]) & 0xFFFF0000 )>> 16)/128)*9/5)+32  
  
ECM_run_time2 = struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record2:record2+4])[0]/4  
Occurrence_distance2 = struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record2+20:record2+24])[0]/205.99605  
Temp2 = (((((struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record2+18:record2+22])[0]) & 0xFFFF0000 )>> 16)/128)*9/5)+32  
  
ECM_run_time3 = struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record3:record3+4])[0]/4  
Occurrence_distance3 = struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record3+20:record3+24])[0]/205.99605  
Temp3 = (((((struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record3+18:record3+22])[0]) & 0xFFFF0000 )>> 16)/128)*9/5)+32
```

# Attribution Result

Record 1 ECM occurrence run time (s): 10437516.0

Record 1 ECM occurrence distance (mile): 109323.35838478456

Record 1 ECM occurrence air temperature (F): 71.9234375

Record 2 ECM occurrence run time (s): 29454947.0

Record 2 ECM occurrence distance (mile): 250785.41069112733

Record 2 ECM occurrence air temperature (F): 55.3015625

Record 3 ECM occurrence run time (s): 6186154.0

Record 3 ECM occurrence distance (mile): 66872.23371516104

Record 3 ECM occurrence air temperature (F): 117.359375

# Python Code for Sudden Decel Records


```
#Parsing through the raw data
for i in range(int((record_size-header_size)/block_size)):
    speed1 = ((struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record1+24+i*block_size : record1+28+i*block_size])[0]) & 0x0000FFFF )/102.455
    rpm1 = ((struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record1+28+i*block_size : record1+32+i*block_size])[0]) & 0x0000FFFF )/8

    speed2 = ((struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record2+24+i*block_size : record2+28+i*block_size])[0]) & 0x0000FFFF )/102.455
    rpm2 = ((struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record2+28+i*block_size : record2+32+i*block_size])[0]) & 0x0000FFFF )/8

    speed3 = ((struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record3+24+i*block_size : record3+28+i*block_size])[0]) & 0x0000FFFF )/102.455
    rpm3 = ((struct.unpack(">L",raw_data[record3+28+i*block_size : record3+32+i*block_size])[0]) & 0x0000FFFF )/8

    time = -59+i
```

# Graphical Result From Binary Interpretation



# Data Analysis: Missing Data

- Reverse Engineered only 8 bytes in the 14 byte block.
  - What do other bytes mean?
  - Which one is the brake status, clutch status, etc.?

**Record 2**

Time (Seconds)	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Engine Speed (rpm)	Engine Load (%)	Throttle (%)	Brake Status	Clutch Status	Cruise Status	Lamp Status
11	6	840	14.6	32.3	-	On	-	-
12	6	1071	38.6	45.5	-	-	-	-
13	8	1235	23.5	38.3	-	-	-	-
14	8	1287	0.0	8.0	-	-	-	-
15	8	952	0.0	22.8	-	On	-	-



# Man In The Middle Attack

- Man In The Middle (MITM) attack for reverse engineering
  - Sudden deceleration data sent from the ECM will be modified by the MITM device to observe how the it changes the record



# Machine-In-the-Middle (MITM) Attack

## Sudden Vehicle Speed Deceleration Report Record 1

Engine Type	ISX 2010	Ecm Code	CL10132.39
Engine Serial Number	60811136	Software Phase	7.70.0.71
Unit Number	0000000000	Extraction Date	04-03-2019 04:37:51
Sudden Decel Threshold Rate:	N/A	ECM Run time	8227:56:32
Occurrence Date: N/A		ECM Run Time at Occurrence: 2899:18:36	
Air Temperature (°F) at Occurrence: 72		Occurrence Distance (mi): 109323.4	

Vehicle Speed



Record 1


Time (Seconds)	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Engine Speed (rpm)	Engine Load (%)	Throttle (%)	Brake Status	Clutch Status	Cruise Status	Lamp Status
-59	6	683	34.8	30.1	-	-	-	-
-58	7	788	33.6	32.2	-	-	-	-
-57	7	813	21.9	27.5	-	-	-	-

Genuine Data

## Sudden Vehicle Speed Deceleration Report Record 1

Engine Type	ISX 2010	Ecm Code	CL10132.39
Engine Serial Number	60811136	Software Phase	7.70.0.71
Unit Number	0000000000	Extraction Date	04-03-2019 02:08:09
Sudden Decel Threshold Rate:	N/A	ECM Run time	8225:27:34
Occurrence Date: N/A		ECM Run Time at Occurrence: 2899:18:36	
Air Temperature (°F) at Occurrence: 72		Occurrence Distance (mi): 109323.4	

Vehicle Speed




Record 1

Time (Seconds)	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Engine Speed (rpm)	Engine Load (%)	Throttle (%)	Brake Status	Clutch Status	Cruise Status	Lamp Status
-59	40	683	34.8	30.1	-	-	-	-
-58	7	788	33.6	32.2	-	-	-	-
-57	7	813	21.9	27.5	-	-	-	-

Attack Data

# Brake, Clutch, Cruise Results



# Data Manipulation

Forensic Soundness and Protecting Against

# Editing Data in Hex

HxD - [C:\Users\dailyadmin\OneDrive - University of Tulsa\Research\Summer 2019\Florida Trip\back up - attaccked.MPC]

File Edit Search View Analysis Tools Window Help


16 Windows (ANSI) hex

back up - attaccked.MPC


Offset (h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	Decoded text
00009510	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00009520	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00009530	1B	EB	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.ë.....
00009540	00	FF	FF	FF	02	7D	0E	30	FF	FF	FF	FF	01	00	00	01	.ÿÿÿ.}..0ÿÿÿÿ....
00009550	01	01	01	00	01	01	0B	17	01	57	A1	74	00	00	13	77	.....W;t...w
00009560	00	00	15	58	00	00	1E	15	22	C4	00	00	00	00	13	B3	...X...Ä...,
00009570	00	00	18	9F	00	00	20	35	21	98	00	00	00	00	13	2A	...Ŷ..5!~....*
00009580	00	00	19	69	00	00	1B	76	15	E0	00	00	00	00	13	F3	...i..v.à....ø
00009590	00	00	19	96	00	00	16	0D	0A	8C	00	00	00	00	02	F6	...-...Œ....ö
000095A0	00	00	18	E5	00	00	0F	B9	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	F9	...å...¹....ù
000095B0	00	00	18	B9	00	00	1D	EC	1A	90	00	00	00	00	03	37	...¹...ì....7
000095C0	00	00	1D	B7	00	00	2C	7D	30	0C	00	00	00	00	03	DE	...,.}0....Þ
000095D0	00	00	23	A9	00	00	33	0C	27	10	00	00	00	00	04	B2	..#©..3.'....²
000095E0	00	00	2B	85	00	00	3F	23	30	70	00	00	00	00	05	9E	..+....?#0p....ž
000095F0	00	00	33	76	00	00	40	94	2B	5C	00	00	00	00	06	04	..3v..@"+\....
00009600	00	00	2F	02	00	00	00	8E	00	00	00	00	00	00	05	EE	../.ž....î
00009610	00	00	25	8D	00	01	13	FB	00	00	00	00	00	00	06	4C	..%....û....L

# Manipulating Speed Records

Original Authentic Record



Manipulated Record



# Forensic Soundness

- **Meaning** is a term that denotes confidence in the interpretation of extracted evidence data.
- **Error Detection** denotes processes for detecting or predicting errors in the forensic process.
- **Transparency** means the forensic process is documented, known, and verifiable.
- **Expertise** is required for investigators examining digital data.
- **Tampering detection** involves processes to evaluate if this has occurred.

# Forensic Soundness: Applied

## Tamper Detection

Digitally sign the file with a secure hash algorithm

Goal: Verify mathematically the data has not been changed from its original form.


Calculated hash values match each time file is used

Challenge: How to compute the original hash?

# Cryptographic Hashing

- Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-256)
  - Calculates a unique 256-bit number based on file contents
  - File contents cannot be determined from the hash
  - Unique for each file (i.e. little chance of a “collision”)
- Windows right click utilities:
  - [https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/hash\\_my\\_files.html](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/hash_my_files.html)
  - <https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/78681-add-file-hash-context-menu-windows-8-10-a.html>


# Calculate Hash with Hex Editor Utility



The screenshot shows the HxD Hex Editor interface. The main window displays the file '4-24-19 CM2350 Forensics Case.MPC' in ASCII mode. The status bar at the bottom shows the offset '131294'. A yellow arrow points from the 'Checksum' table in the bottom right to the 'Checksum' field in the status bar.

Algorithm	Checksum
SHA-256	B7DFCCB1C61C9EBD4EB46F327CEE7748DBDD98C8FEFAF4E1265AF0EDB1EC9872

# Python Source Code: Do the hashes match?




```
C:\Users\jeremy-daily\Dropbox (Synercon)\JHSI\2019-04-20 Cummins ECU Chip Read\Cummins2350BinaryAnalysis.py - Sublime Text
File Edit Selection Find View Goto Tools Project Preferences Help
Cummins2350BinaryAnalysis.py x
1 from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
2 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
3
4 #Calculate Hash Digest from file
5 with open("4-24-19 CM2350 Forensics Case.MPC", 'rb') as file_pointer:
6     binary_file_contents = file_pointer.read()
7 new_hash_digest = hashes.Hash(hashes.SHA256(), backend=default_backend())
8 new_hash_digest.update(binary_file_contents)
9 digest_string = "".join("{:02X}".format(c) for c in new_hash_digest.finalize())
10 print(digest_string)
11
12 #Compare to the old file
13 with open("SHA 256.txt",'r') as sha_file:
14     original_hash_value = sha_file.read()
15 print(original_hash_value)
16 print(digest_string == original_hash_value)

B7DFCCB1C61C9EBD4EB46F327CEE7748DBDD98C8FEFAF4E1265AF0EDB1EC9872
B7DFCCB1C61C9EBD4EB46F327CEE7748DBDD98C8FEFAF4E1265AF0EDB1EC9872
True
[Finished in 0.3s]

Line 1, Column 1
Tab Size: 4
Python
```

Yes

# Hash Values Do Not Match



# Recommended Practice




# Recommended Practice

Take photos or video of opening the ECU.

Document video creation time.


Created at 9:09



# Image the ECU




# Hash the data after Extraction





# Recommended Practice

Immediately after imaging the chip memory:

- Calculate the SHA-256 and save it as a text file.




# Recommended Practice



E-Mail the SHA-256 digest value to a trusted party

Establishes a record with a timestamp when the SHA was calculated

# After Data Preservation, Analyze the New Data




# Confirm with PowerSpec


## Vehicle Sudden Deceleration Report Record 1

Engine Type	B6.7 2017	Ecm Code	HC80013.14
Engine Serial Number	74109625	Software Phase	22.60.70.3
Unit Number	*****	Extraction Date	06-03-2019 09:46:00
Sudden Decel Threshold Rate:	9.01 mph	ECM Run time	1578:40:56
Occurrence Date: N/A		ECM Run Time at Occurrence: 1287:52:34	
Air Temperature (°F) at Occurrence: 91		Occurrence Distance (mi): 37785.1	

Vehicle Speed



Engine Speed



Percent

# Summary and Conclusions

- ECUs may be broken in a crash and not communicate with vehicle networks.
- Board level access provides opportunity to image chips through JTAG programming ports.
- Chip level access reads memory bearing chips directly
- Resulting binary data from Cummins ECUs has Sudden Deceleration Records to decode.
- A man-in-the-middle can help decode the data.
- Data can be manipulated with a hex editor.
- A Secure Hash Algorithm and tight timelines are critical to ensuring forensic verifiability.

# Acknowledgments



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# Autonomous Systems Forensics

Autonomous systems are on the road now

# Overview

- What is the ATMA
- Data Overview
- Data Samples
- Key Challenges
- Recommendations
- Summary



# Autonomous Truck Mounted Attenuator

[https://royaltruckandequipment.com/truck\\_bodies/autonomous-tma/](https://royaltruckandequipment.com/truck_bodies/autonomous-tma/)

[https://royaltruckandequipment.com/truck\\_bodies/autonomous-tma/](https://royaltruckandequipment.com/truck_bodies/autonomous-tma/)

The autonomous TMA system can be used in a nearly unlimited variety of applications. Examples include highway maintenance operations including plowing, sweeping, line striping, and water trucks. The ATMA follower system can be configured to follow almost any vehicle as the leader.

In addition to live deployments, many DOTs have worked with universities to conduct live testing and evaluation of the system. These published reports show the potential for the ATMA to bring us closer toward zero deaths.



Tennessee  
DOT



North Dakota  
DOT



Missouri DOT



Minnesota DOT



Florida DOT



Colorado DOT



Colas U.K. DOT



Caltrans DOT

# Leader – Follower System



CDOT Paint Stripper as leader



Autonomous Truck Mounted Attenuator as follower

# Leader – Follower System



Photo by  
John Daily





# Automated Truck Mounted Attenuator

- Leader sends GPS Based Breadcrumbs
- Follower seeks a following distance along the breadcrumb path




## Questions:

- What type of forensic log data exists for these systems?
- Is the data reliable? (Available and accurate)

# Motivation



# ATMA Data Sources



# ATMA Onboard Data Overview

- Data Sources:
  - Native Vehicle data – Available via J1939 standard interface. Includes log files for engine ECU, transmission, and brake controller
  - ATMA specific log files – Log files generated from ATMA specific commands and navigation information




J1939  
Diagnostic  
Port



# Native vehicle Data Sample:

## Sudden Vehicle Speed Deceleration Report Record 2

- Data captured through the leader's diagnostic port using Cummins Powerspec software
- Data collection performed on 6 July 2021
- Shows leader vehicle events
  - Brake
  - Accelerator pedal
  - Vehicle Speed
  - Engine RPM
- Common for incident response



Record 2

Time (Seconds)	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Engine Speed (rpm)	Engine Load (%)	Throttle (%)	Brake Status	Clutch Status	Cruise Status	Lamp Status
-16	33	1030	28.5	35.6	-	-	-	-
-15	33	1032	41.4	44.4	-	-	-	-
-14	33	1031	32.8	38.4	-	-	-	-
-13	33	1026	15.2	26.0	-	-	-	-
-12	33	1039	33.6	39.6	-	-	-	-
-11	33	1049	29.3	37.6	-	-	-	-
-10	34	1069	23.8	34.8	-	-	-	-
-9	34	1072	3.1	19.2	-	-	-	-
-8	34	1078	0.0	0.0	On	-	-	-
-7	34	1054	0.0	0.0	On	-	-	-
-6	33	996	0.0	0.0	On	-	-	-
-5	31	1251	0.0	0.0	On	-	-	-
-4	30	1222	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-
-3	30	1230	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-
-2	30	1185	0.0	0.0	On	-	-	-
-1	28	1158	0.0	0.0	On	-	-	-
0	25	872	0.0	0.0	On	-	-	-
1	17	796	0.0	0.0	On	-	-	-
2	8	699	19.9	0.0	On	-	-	-
3	4	710	17.6	0.0	On	-	-	-
4	3	701	19.5	0.0	-	-	-	-
5	3	1215	37.5	69.2	-	-	-	-
6	6	1633	53.9	72.4	-	-	-	-
7	9	2076	67.6	75.2	-	-	-	-
8	11	1898	80.9	79.6	-	-	-	-
9	15	1981	89.5	91.2	-	-	-	-
10	18	1780	100.0	91.6	-	-	-	-
11	21	2023	88.3	84.8	-	-	-	-
12	23	1875	35.2	70.8	-	-	-	-
13	25	1588	54.7	64.0	-	-	-	-
14	26	1286	47.7	63.6	-	-	-	-
15	27	1138	65.2	70.8	-	-	-	-

# ATMA Log Data Sample:



## AIPV System

Enhanced Work Zone Safety Solution

### LOG DOWN-LOAD PROCEDURE

May 9, 2019 Rev -

**KRATOS**  
UNMANNED SYSTEMS DIVISION

**Royal**  
TRUCK & EQUIPMENT INC.

Data Headers available in the .CSV log files downloaded from the ATMA Limon System in January 2022 testing

**Table 1. Data Headers from ATMA CSV Log File**

Vehicle	Crumb	Stamp	Lat	Lon	Alt	Heading	Heading (Desired)	Velocity
Velocity (Desired)	Gap	Gap (Desired)	#of Satellites	Valid	CTE	Accel	Steer	State

# ATMA Log Data Sample:

wer - CDOT\_TEST\_DAY3 > CDOT\_TEST\_DAY3 > ASTOP\_9MPH > RUN1 > FOLLOWER

Name

CDOT\_ASTOP\_9MPH\_RUN1\_2021-04-08\_14-08-36\_nav  
 follower  
 follower  
 gps  
 nav  
 overhe  
 timeset

Is this based on  
GPS or System  
Clock?

 follower - Notepad  
 File Edit Format View Help  
 FLW\_OFFSETS,0.000,0.000,0.025,2,1.200,0.000  
 Heading PID:2.200,0.000,0.000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000  
 CTE PID:0.000,0.000,0.000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000  
 Waiting for leader Go  
 level=2; description=Adjacent Object Detected; sensor=LIDAR; frame=LDR\_OFFSETS,0.000,0.000,0.025,1,1.168,0.000,0.000  
 LDR, stamp=14085110, dra\_time=0.0000, dra\_distance=0.0000, lat=37.442100, lon=-105.857150083, alt=2281.765, vcr=14070320, 3, 3, 14.5.8440,19.8680,24.9240,0.0070,0.0140,0.0140,0  
 NAV, stamp=14085120, dra\_time=0.00, dra\_distance=0.00, lat=37.442100, lon=-105.857150083, alt=2281.765, vcr=14070320, 3, 3, 14.5.8440,19.8680,24.9240,0.0070,0.0140,0.0140,0  
 FLW\_OFFSETS,0.000,0.000,0.025,2,1.200,0.000  
 Heading PID:2.200,0.000,0.000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000  
 CTE PID:0.000,0.000,0.000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000  
 Waiting for leader Go  
 level=2; description=Adjacent Object Detected; sensor=LIDAR; frame=LDR\_OFFSETS,0.000,0.000,0.025,1,1.168,0.000,0.000  
 LDR, stamp=14085130, dra\_time=0.00, dra\_distance=0.00, lat=37.442100, lon=-105.857150083, alt=2281.765, vcr=14070320, 3, 3, 14.5.8440,19.8680,24.9240,0.0070,0.0140,0.0140,0  
 NAV, stamp=14085140, dra\_time=0.00, dra\_distance=0.00, lat=37.442100, lon=-105.857150083, alt=2281.765, vcr=14070320, 3, 3, 14.5.8440,19.8680,24.9240,0.0070,0.0140,0.0140,0  
 Last VCR=14085110; This VCR=14085120; took(ms)=137.23  
 Checking nav; nav\_time=14085120  
 LDR\_OFFSETS,0.000,0.000,0.025,1,1.168,0.000,0.000  
 LDR, stamp=14085120, dra\_time=0.00, dra\_distance=0.00, lat=37.442100, lon=-105.857150083, alt=2281.765, vcr=14070320, 3, 3, 14.5.8440,19.8680,24.9240,0.0070,0.0140,0.0140,0  
 NAV, stamp=14085140, dra\_time=0.00, dra\_distance=0.00, lat=37.442100, lon=-105.857150083, alt=2281.765, vcr=14070320, 3, 3, 14.5.8440,19.8680,24.9240,0.0070,0.0140,0.0140,0  
 FLW\_OFFSETS,0.000,0.000,0.025,2,1.200,0.000  
 Heading PID:2.200,0.000,0.000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000  
 CTE PID:0.000,0.000,0.000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000  
 ...



 gps - Notepad  
 File Edit Format View Help  
 GPS\_POS,0.0977, 14070330,0,26, 37.442813117,-105.857150083,2281.765,0, vcr=14070330, 3, 3, 14.5.8440,19.8680,24.9240,0.0070,0.0140,0.0140,0  
 VCR, 14070330, 3, 3, 14.5.8440,19.8680,24.9240,0.0070,0.0140,0.0140,0  
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 VCR, 14070400, 3, 3, 14.5.8440,19.8710,24.9220,0.0080,0.0150,0.0160,0  
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These data raise  
questions regarding  
timing, accuracy,  
and source.

TIME	VEH	CRUMB	STAMP	LAT	LON	ALT	HDG	HDG		VEL		GAP		VALID	CTE	ACCEL	STEER	STATE		
								(Desired)	VELOCITY	(Desired)	GAP	(Desired)	#SATS							
38:17.0	FLW	457	20381700	39.27197	-103.7308	1632.171	285.99	286.153		17.69	17.91	48.88		30.5	27	1	0.41	53.59	-3.95	RUN
38:17.1	LDR	476	20381690	39.27213	-103.7315	1630.346	286.4	17.79		286.3	400	77								
38:17.1	FLW	457	20381710	39.27198	-103.7308	1632.173	285.86	286.143		17.67	17.82	48.89		30.5	27	1	0.42	52.99	-4.27	RUN
38:17.2	LDR	477	20381700	39.27213	-103.7315	1630.347	286.41	17.77		286.8	401	77								
38:17.2	FLW	457	20381720	39.27198	-103.7309	1632.18	285.84	286.146		17.85	17.78	48.9		30.5	27	1	0.43	50.74	-4.33	RUN
38:17.2	LDR	478	20381710	39.27213	-103.7315	1630.34	286.39	17.94		285.6	402	77								
38:17.3	FLW	457	20381730	39.27198	-103.7309	1632.175	285.87	286.15		18.08	17.85	48.9		30.5	27	1	0.43	49.3	-4.26	RUN
38:17.3	LDR	479	20381720	39.27214	-103.7315	1630.339	286.33	17.9		286.3	403	77								
38:17.4	FLW	457	20381740	39.27198	-103.7309	1632.184	285.86	286.148		18.16	17.92	48.9		30.5	27	1	0.42	49.25	-4.18	RUN
38:17.5	LDR	480	20381730	39.27214	-103.7316	1630.341	286.31	17.82		287.1	404	77								
38:17.5	FLW	457	20381750	39.27198	-103.7309	1632.189	285.8	286.153		18.19	17.86	48.89		30.5	27	1	0.43	48.29	-4.33	RUN

# ATMA Data Analysis (Initial):

- Cursory Analysis of the logs generates the following:
  - Scatter plot analysis of the GPS Speed vs Timestamp in Excel
  - Google Earth can import .csv or .kml file data and plot a breadcrumb trace of Lat vs Long



- NOTE: Kratos has provided a Python script for automating some of this analysis but at this time further investigation and troubleshooting is being performed on its use.
  - Of specific interest is a method to combine leader and follower logs to generate a combined location breadcrumb path trace

# Key Challenge: Data Attribution

- Incident Response to a crash for traditional heavy vehicles has well defined procedures
  - Law Enforcement and investigators are familiar with procedures to download vehicle log files via the standard J1939 interfaces
- Procedures for incident response to autonomous heavy vehicles are in their infancy
  - ATMA specific log data download procedures are new and unfamiliar for law enforcement and investigators
    - Area for Improvement 3.2 from the Tabletop: Streamline and provide data download and handling procedures
- **Issue:** Lack of Common Data Fields Between Powertrain Data Logs and ATMA Data Logs
  - Powertrain data does NOT include a Timestamp – uses Engine Hours for time reference
  - Attribution can also be made using odometer readings
  - ATMA specific logs do NOT include any vehicle network data
    - Wheel Speed should correlate to GPS speed
    - At low speeds wheel speed may be more accurate
    - Currently, these signals are not synchronized

NOTE: This time is counting down to Captured Event, not a GPS Time

**Table 1. Data Headers from ATMA CSV Log File**

Vehicle	Crumb	Stamp	Lat	Lon	Alt	Heading	Heading (Desired)	Velocity
Velocity (Desired)	Gap	Gap (Desired)	#of Satellites	Valid	CTE	Accel	Steer	State

**Powerspec Data Header**

Time (Seconds)	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Engine Speed (rpm)	Engine Load (%)	Throttle (%)	Brake Status	Clutch Status	Cruise Status	Lamp Status
)								




# CSU ATMA Data Collection Testing

## 13 Jan 2022

- Test 1 – Sudden Deceleration – Leader Initiated Heavy Braking
- Test 2 – Sudden Deceleration – ESTOP Leader
- Test 3 – Sudden Deceleration – ESTOP Follower
- Test 4 – Uncommanded Sudden Stop from Follower
- Test 5 – Sudden Deceleration – Barrel Intrusion



# Test Result Data Samples



# Data and Security Recommendations:

**Recommendation 1: Improve data attribution** -- Add vehicle specific data sources to ATMA specific log to facilitate direct comparison to vehicle network data logs.

**Recommendation 2: Produce clear and concise ATMA data retrieval procedures** – In accordance with the Tabletop After Action Report, Area for Improvement 3.2 highlights the need for clear data download and handling procedures, written for DOT personnel, law enforcement, and other investigators.

**Recommendation 3: Deliver a user friendly ATMA log analysis tool** – current ATMA log file analysis is cumbersome and does not have a GUI or user-friendly interface to generate plots, charts, and tables of relevant data for incident response.


**Recommendation 4: Clarify roles for support to interpret log files** – Are there any contractual obligations for ATMA vendor to support the gathering or interpreting log files after an incident?

**Recommendation 5: Modify the ATMA logging system to continue to log after an ESTOP-** resting showed the ATMA logs terminate upon the loss of ignition power in an ESTOP. The data during the commanded Estop hard braking event is critical information in the case of an accident

# Recommendation 1: Improve Data Attribution

- Currently ATMA logs do not include vehicle specific CAN Bus data from J1939.
  - This is challenging for correlating powertrain data to ATMA specific information
- SAE Standard J3197-Automated Driving System Data Logger provides specific recommended minimum data logger data elements for automated driver systems
- Proposed Solution:** Add powertrain data to ATMA specific log
  - Can be accomplished via a Data Diode from the J1939 CAN Network to broadcast UDP packets. A data diode would preserve security through physical restriction of a one-way data flow

**Sudden Vehicle Speed Deceleration Report Record 1**



**SURFACE VEHICLE  
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE**

**J3197™**

**J**

Issued 2020-04  
Revised 2021-07

Superseding J3197 APR202

Automated Driving System Data Logger

# Recommendation 2: Produce Clear and Concise ATMA Data Retrieval Procedures

- Current ATMA log file download procedures are complex and not readily available in the vehicles.
  - Procedure is written for engineers with familiarity in Linux systems
  - Few users are trained on how to accomplish ATMA log file download
  - Current download process uses “root” permission which is a known security vulnerability (See [Security Engineering](#) by Ross Anderson).
  - From the Tabletop AAR Area for Improvement 3.2

“Participating agencies acknowledged the lack of protocols stating what to do with the data that is extracted from the vehicle and how to manage it for further investigation or storage.”
- Procedures should be explicit and clear for download and handling of the data to ensure the integrity of the data if an incident occurs
  - This process will likely mimic existing vehicle data downloads but needs to be explicitly defined for ATMA




**AIPV System**  
Enhanced Work Zone Safety Solution

LOG DOWN-LOAD PROCEDURE  
May 9, 2019 Rev -


**KRATOS**  
UNMANNED SYSTEMS DIVISION

**Royal**  
TRUCK & EQUIPMENT INC.



# Recommendation 3: Deliver a user friendly ATMA log analysis tool

- Current ATMA log analysis is either done with inefficient Excel analysis or a Python script.
  - Many users may not be familiar with python
    - The current Python script requires download of multiple Python add in packages and does not use a GUI
- A GUI based tool could be developed that would create a user-friendly interface to a script to ingest the data logs and produce tables and graphics of interest for an incident
- Log files should be digitally signed to prevent undetected manipulation



```
109     self.gps_lat = (float(logger_str[8]))
110     self.gps_lon = (float(logger_str[9]))
111     self.center_lat = (float(logger_str[10]))
112     self.center_lon = (float(logger_str[11]))
113     self.nav_lat = (float(logger_str[12]))
114     self.nav_lon = (float(logger_str[13]))
115     self.heading = (float(logger_str[20]))
116     self.state = logger_str[2].strip(' \r\n')
117     success = True
118     if( abs(self.gps_lat) > 0.01 and abs(self.gps_lon) > 0.01 ) :
119         self.gps_valid = True
120     if( abs(self.center_lat) > 0.01 and abs(self.center_lon) > 0.01 ) :
121         self.center_valid = True
122     if( abs(self.nav_lat) > 0.01 and abs(self.nav_lon) > 0.01 ) :
123         self.nav_valid = True
124     finally:
125         return success
126
127 def update_parser_update(self,logger_str):
128     success = False
129     try:
130         self.ts = logger_str[3].strip()
131         self.vehicle_name = logger_str[0].strip()
132         self.gps_lat = (float(logger_str[4]))
133         self.gps_lon = (float(logger_str[5]))
134         self.heading = (float(logger_str[6]))
135         self.cte = 0.0
136         self.steer_cmd = 0.0
137         self.state = logger_str[1].strip(' \r\n')
138         self.desired_heading = 0.0
139         success = True
140         if( abs(self.gps_lat) > 0.01 and abs(self.gps_lon) > 0.01 ) :
141             self.gps_valid = True
142         if( abs(self.center_lat) > 0.01 and abs(self.center_lon) > 0.01 ) :
143             self.center_valid = True
144         if( abs(self.nav_lat) > 0.01 and abs(self.nav_lon) > 0.01 ) :
145             self.nav_valid = True
146     finally:
147         return success
148
149 def strip_characters(self,logger_str):
150     new_logger = []
151     for index in logger_str:
```

```
214     flw_state = ""
215     flw_state_prev = ""
216     ldr_state_prev = ""
217
218     finput = open(self.csv_file_str, 'r') #Opens the input csv file
219     finputname = os.path.splitext(self.csv_file_str)[0]
220     next(finput)
221     for line in finput:
222         if not line:
223             break
224         data_array = re.split(",|",line)
225         if len(data_array) < 2:
226             continue
227         line_cmd = data_array[1].strip(' \r\n')
228         if line_cmd == "FLW":
229             csv_parser.update_parser_flw(data_array)
230             selffollower_latitude.append(csv_parser.center_lat)
231             selffollower_longitude.append(csv_parser.center_lon)
232             selfsteer_cmds.append(csv_parser.steer_cmd)
233             selfctes.append(csv_parser.cte)
234             selfactual_headings.append(csv_parser.heading)
235             selfdesired_headings.append(csv_parser.desired_heading)
236             deltax_heading = pp.calculate_angle_difference(csv_parser.heading,csv_parser.desired_heading)
237             selfdelta_headings.append(deltax_heading)
238
239             if flw_state != csv_parser.state:
240                 if flw_center_count != 0:
241                     self.line_segments.append(flw_center_segment)
242                 if flw_gps_count != 0:
243                     self.line_segments.append(flw_gps_segment)
244                 if flw_nav_count != 0:
245                     self.line_segments.append(flw_nav_segment)
246
247             # RUN, ROLLOUT, IDLE
248             flw_center_segment = line_segment(("FLW-{0}-{1}").format(csv_parser.state))
249             ("FLW-{0}").format(csv_parser.state))
250             flw_gps_segment = line_segment(("FLW_GPS-{0}-{1}").format(csv_parser.state))
251             ("FLW_GPS-{0}").format(csv_parser.state)
252             flw_nav_segment = line_segment(("FLW_NAV-{0}-{1}").format(csv_parser.state))
253             ("FLW_NAV-{0}").format(csv_parser.state)
254             flw_state = csv_parser.state
255             flw_center_count = 0
256             flw_gps_count = 0
257             flw_nav_count = 0
```



# Recommendation 4: Clarify roles for support to interpret log files

- DOT acquisition documents should have specific requirements language of roles and responsibilities for
  - Log data collection
  - Secure log data storage
  - File download procedures
  - Data interpretation and analysis
  - Training for incident response activities
- Understand how to perform these incident response functions without the ATMA vendor (i.e. practice)



# Recommendation 5: Modify the ATMA logging system to continue to log after an ESTOP

- CSU tests Executed multiped ESTOP events- during each one the Kratos recording system abruptly terminated after the ESTOP was commanded
  - ESTOP cuts ignition power to the follower vehicle
  - Kratos designed logger to require ignition power to record data
- Data between the commanded ESTOP and the vehicle actually coming to a stop is critical data in the event of an accident



# Questions?

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Colorado State University